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Since the 18th century, orthodox economics rests on the belief that if markets 
were fully competitive, there would be a general efficiency. The current 
financial malfunctions, accordingly, would not result from free competition, but 
rather from insufficient competition. This statement is strong, for it rests on a 
sophisticated conceptual framework within which there is no dysfunction when 
perfect competition prevails. But it is also strongly unrealistic, for it rejects 
public interventions even when markets obviously lost there bearings in the 
storm. In fact most of those who referred to the orthodox approach before the 
financial crisis, are now, inconsistently, claiming for public interventions. There 
is however a consistent way of thinking about necessary public interventions. 
Indeed, John Maynard Keynes focus on fundamental uncertainty consequences 
questioned the supposed virtues of competition and offered the most elaborated 
alternative as for thinking about the current turnmoils and designing the 
necessary stabilizers. 
 
The postulate that free competition delivers a ‘natural order’ has a crucial role in 
the orthodox theory: it allows for supposing that the economic system is stable 
enough, so that agents may correctly predict the consequences of their economic 
and financial decisions, even in the long run. Keynes, on the contrary, built his 
General Theory by reconsidering the functioning of competitive markets in the 
absence of any anchor for expectations, so that individual decisions have no 
natural or optimal solution; they depend on the changing ‘views concerning the 
future’ and on the agents confidence as regard their previsions. Keynes central 
concepts like liquidity preference, animal spirits, conventional rate of interest…, 
result from this approach. 
 
The ‘degree of confidence’ is a key concept of decision theory in uncertain 
contexts. Knight put it forward from 1921 on. This is formally recognized in the 
modern decision theory and in behavioural and experimental theories. Actually, 
a growing empirical and theoretical literature questions the mainstream 
methodology more and more seriously and supports Keynes’s vision (see my 
paper on ‘the growing evidence of Keynes’s methodology advantage’, 
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00189221/fr/). Accordingly, Nobel 
price 2006 Edmund Phelps claimed last year in the American Economic Review 
that “… if an economy possesses dynamism, so that fresh uncertainties 
incessantly flow from its innovative activities and its structure is everchanging, 
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the concept of rational-expectations equilibrium does not apply and a model of 
such an economy that imposes this concept cannot represent at all well the 
mechanism of such an economy’s fluctuation.” 
 
Victoria Chick pointed out that, in order to make such a dynamic analytically 
tractable, Keynes takes the ‘views about the future’ as exogenous variables likely 
to change according to the context. Keynes thereby put forward that competitive 
markets form a demand driven moving system (‘shifting equilibrium’), not a 
supply driven system. Financial choices and interest rates are of major 
importance in this respect. As they have no ‘natural anchor’, the equilibrium 
position depends on the ‘views about the future’ and on the state of confidence, 
while the mainstream only reckons the optimal solution for a competitive 
system. This is why The General Theory is basically more general than the 
mainstream theory, and more realistic as it doesn’t rest on the reduction of true 
uncertainty to risk. 
 
As, in the mainstream approach to competitive markets, the market price 
adjustment drives decisions towards the cleared market position, unemployment 
simply cannot result from a deficient aggregate demand. In the presence of 
strong uncertainty on the other hand, the adjustment caused by a depressed 
aggregate demand meet various obstacles. The General Theory states therefore 
that “Say’s law”1 may not work because of the obstacle that the liquidity 
preference oppose to the equalization of aggregate saving and investment 
through the interest rate adjustment. Since, consequently, the production of 
goods and services is not ensured to find a sufficient demand, firms must adjust 
their production to the expected level of demand (thereby adjusting saving to 
investment), which, in spite of free competition, is not ensured to be 
spontaneously driven to the full employment level. 
 
The effective demand principle would however be limited to a mere temporary 
phenomenon if wage flexibility was able to straighten aggregate demand after a 
delay; the supply side would dominate eventually. But, as Keynes put forward in 
The General Theory ch. 19, flex-price markets do not remove unemployment 
necessarily, and may even increase it through its negative effects on effective 
demand. In that case, competitive forces may well turn out destabilizing. 
Accordingly, by contrast with the so called ‘New Keynesian Economics’, wage 
rigidity is not the cause of unemployment in Keynes’s theory; this rigidity, on 
the contrary, is the necessary stabilizing response of workers to cumulative 
depressive forces and potential instability. Contrasting with orthodox 
macroeconomics, where competition induces flexible prices and optimal 
employment, competitive forces may induce unemployment and institutional 
resistance to instability: "If […] money-wages were to fall without limit 
whenever there was a tendency for less than full employment, […] there would 
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be no resting-place below full employment until either the rate of interest was 
incapable of falling further or wages were zero. In fact we must have some 
factor, the value of which in terms of money is, if not fixed, at least sticky, to 
give us any stability of values in a monetary system.' (The General Theory, 303-
304). 
 
It turns out that induced institutional responses in the labour market and, to the 
extent that monetary institutions influence the interest rate, in the monetary-
financial markets do not merely take part of the exogenous context, but also take 
part endogenously in the adjustment process towards a stable solution. Liquidity 
pumping, banks bail out or nationalisations and economic policy responses in 
general obeys similar motivations. Although they look to be distortions in the 
competitive process from the orthodox point of view, they actually work as 
hedges against destabilizing competitive forces. This is the reason why, in spite 
of the absence of a ‘natural order’, competitive systems are relatively stable. On 
the other hand, to suppress institutional safeguards, in the name of a dogmatic 
belief in the virtues of free competition, would certainly precipitate economies 
in the chaos. 
 
These considerations should also change the common view on Keynes’s 
economic policy recommendations. Fundamental uncertainty discredits the 
flawed ‘hydraulic Keynesianism’ according to which moving adequately such 
and such curve within an IS/LM framework, or any aggregate demand function 
in ‘New Keynesian’ models, would solve the problem. The General Theory 
invites us to more prudence and tact, but this would require that economic policy 
makers and advisers admit the fundamental uncertainty of the real world and 






1. Remember that, at the macro level, aggregate investment must absorb the 
whole part of the production which is not sold for consumption, that is, 
aggregate saving, if the production of goods and services is to be entirely sold. 
